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BOOK REVIEWS
ACCIDENT LAW. By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington, D. C.: Columbus
Law Book Co., 1947. Pp. x, 315. $7.50.

AVIATION

It is significant that the latest book on Aviation Law treats of only a small segment of the "new law" which man's flight through air has occasioned. Once before
Mr. Rhyne recognized the need for devoting more pages to narrower scope and authored Airports and The Courts (1944), following his Civil Aeronautics Acts Allnwtated (1939).
For as amazing as the fulfillment of Maurice Paurier's vision in 1933 that an
airplane would some day cross the American continent in five and a half hours is
the fact that in the same fifteen years Aviation Law has emerged as a field of law
and its practice a specialty in which many lawyers have evinied considerable interest. Its bulk today warrants such special treatment as the author accords it.
Expressed on the title page is the keynote of this volume: "A Complete Collection
And Analysis Of All Reported Court Decisions Involving Aircraft Accidents Together With A Reference To Legislation And International Conventions Which Have
Application In This Field"; and among the prefatory remarks, ". . . its chief purpose is to collect this material in one" place so that it may be readily available for
lawyers who must inquire into liabilities arising out of aviation accidents." But the
reader is cautioned, ". . . since the court decisions considered herein are limited to
those in aviation cases and since these decisions are based in part upon general
legal principles developed for other forms of transportation, lawyers using this
volume should supplement the material presented by a thorough study of cases in
their various jurisdictions which involve liabilities incurred in other forms of transportation."
Accordingly, where other eminent scholars and writers have given the bar excellent
works on Aviation Law,' but perforce have been able to allot only a small part of
the text to tort liability, the author, by the simple expedient of interposing the word
"accident," has come forth with an exhaustive work on negligence in aviation cases.
The tables of source material and court decisions are excellent. The footnotes are
thorough and scholarly r~sum~s without verbosity. I was particularly impressed by
the chapter format, typical of which is the very first, to wit: Aircraft Operators as
Common or Private Carriers.
A. Cases Holding Common Carrier Status Existed.
B. Cases Holding Common Carrier Status Did Not Exist.
C. Degree of Care Required of Common Carrier.
D. Degree of Care Required of Private or Contract Carrier.
E. Statutory Provisions Applicable to Aircraft Operator Accident Liabilities.
This simplicity and orderliness is carried out in the writing and the style is free
and easy, the vocabulary understandable. An aviation lexicon is not a part of this book
nor required because the author does not allow himself to lapse into the jargon
of the pilot or the terminology of his equipment. This will be appreciated by those
lawyers who soar to great heights in the courtroom but for the nonce prefer to keep
at least one foot on the ground.
Indicative of the thorough treatment are the following chapter titles: Types of
1.
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Aircraft Accidents, Liability of Manufacturers, Repairmen and Vendors, Damage to
Baggage and Express, Liability of Bailees of Airplanes, Violation of Ordinance,
Regulation or Statute as Negligence, Inspection or Lack of Inspection as Evidence
on Issue of Negligence, Proof of Cause of Aviation Accidents-Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, Defenses in Aircraft Accident Cases, Workmen's Compensation and
Aviation Accidents, Insurance and Aviation Accidents, Aviation Accidents in International Air Transportation. Further sub-titled to develop a superb Table of Contents and supplemented by a twenty-page Index, this work becomes a speedy reference volume, a multiple brief on a varied assortment of points.
No attempt has been made to present systematically in textual form or appendix,
the laws of the several states relating to aviation. That would have been an herculean
task and its inclusion of doubtful value inasmuch as many states now have under
consideration or are revising aeronautical codes or, as in the case of New York,
the statutes specifically relating to aviation, aviators and aircraft are to be found
in eighteen apparently unrelated Titles of the Consolidated Laws and the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
The author neither propounds theory nor adopts a dogmatic position but merely
reports the available decisions, sometimes paradoxical and antithetic, with occasional preliminary or concluding comments or helpful analysis. Therefore he presented no opportunity for me to be argumentative in this review. I can only recommend his effort as a magnificent service to his professional colleagues of both bench
and bar and express my belief, as does United States Senator Pat McCarren in
the Foreword, that this volume will become a springboard for research by attorneys
with problems in the realm of aviation accident law, and prove "an invaluable tool
with which to work in developing this field of aviation law."
Truly, a provocative little book, particularly for negligence lawyers whose automobile-riding clients are even now or will soon be dropping in to present for merit
analysis their causes of action against the "Aitostratus Air Transport Company."
VNCENT

T.

BAnON.'E

RUFUS DAY: SUPMEE COURT JusTIcE FROM OHIO. By Joseph E. McLean.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1946. Pp. xiv, 172. $2.00.

WILLTA

This brief study deals mainly with Justice Day's contribution to Constitutional
Law during his years on the Supreme Court bench (1903-1922). Dr. McLean
analyzes the most important of Day's opinions and presents him as a "States Rights
Federalist" who insisted equally upon a "strict" construction of national powers,
and a "liberal" construction of state powers.'
So long as our Federal System lasts, the determination of where state powers end
and national powers begin will be the central problem of American Constitutional
Law. All of us, whether judges or not, make our contribution to the solution of
that problem, for our generation at least, by the attitude we take to Federalism.
If we regard it as but a temporary stage on the way to complete centralization
made inevitable by the pressures of an economic system each year increasingly

t Member of the New York Bar. Director and Treasurer, New York State Aviation
Council.
1. P. 157.
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unified, we are apt to view impatiently, refined legal concepts developed to give it
living reality. If, on the other hand, we regard local self-government as something
of permanent value best protected by a constantly vitalized Federalism, we will be
more tolerant of such concepts, though admitting they may work, at times, inconveniently and even inefficiently. Believing that we cannot have our cake and eat
it too, we will be the more readily convinced that hasty resort to national legislation whenever the working of the Federal System delays or impedes the achievement
of social ends deemed in themselves desirable, may well destroy the advantages Federalism concededly affords.
Justice Day apparently saw in Federalism abiding values worth the cost of preservation. 2 Dr. McLean suggests that this attitude may be traceable to Day's distinguished ancestry. Great-grandson of a Chief Justice of Connecticut, grandson of a
Justice, and son of the Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Day is said
to have inherited a profound respect for the value and integrity of state governmental processes. 3 This interesting Freudian probing into Day's "inarticulate premises" does not leave enough room for the judge's own sense of intellectual honesty.
After all, Day was called upon to interpret a Constitution which "in all its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States." 4
When Justice Day came to the Supreme Court in 1903, after four years as a
Circuit Court Judge, the business of the Court was fast losing its earlier common
law flavor. 5 More and more was it being called upon to determine how new national
and state legislation designed to meet the demands of an age which saw the slow
death of nineteenth century laissez-fairism, could be fitted into the frame of the
Constitution without warping it. Nationally, the power most often used to achieve
the new objectives was the congressional power over interstate commerce. Day
realized that if the potentials of this mighty grant to the national government were
exerted to the full, the states could easily shrink to the level of mere administrative units of an all-powerful central government.( The shell of Federalism would
remain after the principle of local self-government which once informed it had long
since departed. Inescapable, nevertheless, was the demand for national legislation
to meet problems apparently national in scope and seemingly not resolvable otherwise. How could these two imperatives be reconciled within the limits of the
Constitution?
Justice Day, as Dr. McLean shows, 7 developed a concept of "transportation" as
distinguished from "production" in determining when the interstate commerce power
could be validly exercised. "The making of goods and the mining of coal are not
commerce, nor does the fact that these things are to be afterward shipped, or used
in interstate commerce make their production a part thereof."3 This distinction
Day employed when, speaking for the majority, he found the first "child labor"
law unconstitutional.0 That law attempted to get at the evil of child labor by excluding from interstate commerce, products of establishments wherein children under
2.

P. 77.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Pp. 13, 79, 161.
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (U. S. 1868).
P. 59.
P. 81.
Pp. 72, 76.
Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 444-45 (1915).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 272 (1918).
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a prescribed age were employed more than a specified number of hours thirty days
prior to the shipment of their products over state lines. Day attempted to distinguish the holding from cases where the Court had recognized the power of
Congress to exclude other products from interstate commerce,10 by pointing out
that in those cases the articles excluded were either noxious in themselves, or the
use of interstate commerce channels was necessary to give them their harmful effect.
The articles involved in the "child labor" statute were "harmless" in themselves,
and their carriage in interstate commerce did not give them a harmful character
which they had lacked before."1
The decision was under fire from the outset. It was attacked as creating a "Dual
Federalism,"' 2 and as creating a "zone of anarchy" into which an effective war on
child labor could not be carried either by state or national legislation. In 1941,
3
Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in Undted States v. Darby,2
buried Day's
concepts and distinctions for all time by expressly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart.'4 The basic problem with which Day had struggled cannot, however, be so
easily interred. It remains as long as Federalism remains, or at least as long as
Federalism is regarded as something worth keeping. If congressional power over
interstate commerce carries with it unrestricted power to regulate the incidents and
details of the productive process within a state, either because the products are
destined for interstate shipment, or because in modem American economic life,
productive and transportation processes are inseparable, how is Federalism as a
vital thing and not as a mere form to be preserved? Day's approach to the problem, though now repudiated, may still have value, at least as a point of departure,
for those who believe as he did, that Federalism has permanent values, and are
willing to pay the price preservation of those values demands. For it is by the steady
attrition of Day's views that we have reached the stage where we now find ourselves
in the ever-increasing scope being given to the commerce clause.
Dr. McLean's able analysis of Day's opinions is a corrective to those who think
that insistence upon "States Rights" today is, at best, merely sentimental piety or,
at the worst, a desperate rear-guard action by the retreating forces of "laissez-faire."
Day, though never writing with Holmes' literary flair, was yet of Holmes' school
in insisting upon a liberal interpretation of the states' police power.' 0 Day, like
Holmes, was reluctant to use the due process clause to strike down state legislation attempting to grapple with the new complex economic and social problems of
the Industrial Age. Though some contemporary "liberals" failed to notice it, Day,
in the first child labor case, had been at pains to point out "That there should be
limitations upon the right to employ children in mines and factories in the interest of their own and the public welfare, all will admit."' 0 And Day, like Holmes,
dissented when the Court (over forty years ago) used the due process clause to say
10. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 30S (1913); Champion v.
Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
11.

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271-72 (1918).

12.

Pp. 78-79, and see CoRwm, TnE TwxLIGrrrOF TE SuPREMM CoUT

13. 312 U. S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
14. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
15. Pp. 137-38.
16. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 275 (1918).

26-27 (1934).
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that a state could not fix a maximum ten hour day for bakery workers. 17 In Coppage
v. Kansas,i8 Day again dissented when the Court struck down an early attempt to
outlaw "yellow dog contracts." ". . nothing is better settled by the repeated decisions of this court," he said, "than that the right of contract is not absolute and
unyielding, but is subject to limitation and restraint in the interests of the public
health, safety, and welfare, and such limitations may be declared in legislation of
the State."' 9 Dr. McLean finds "that Day judicially approved almost every exercise
of the state police power." 20 .
Justice Day from the outset of his judicial career, stood for the vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. He favored its literal interpretation. Hence
he early opposed reading into it "the rule of reason." True, he silently acquiesced
when Chief Justice White adopted that test in 1911,21 but as Dr. McLean suggests,
this change of theory did not' seem to involve any serious departure from his position as "one of the strongest, if not the strongest," advocate of strict interpretation of the act itself, for, as the cases 'show, "Conduct that prior to 1911 was
condemned as illegal restraint
was generally held unreasonable per so thereafter
22
and therefore unlawful."
Justice Day's philosophy with regard, to anti-trust cases is well summarized by
Dr. McLean. The form the combination took was of relative unimportance. In
United States v. Union P. R. R., "the most severe application of the Sherman
Act," 2 3 Day held the statute violated by defendant's acquisition of a forty-six
per cent interest in the stock of the Southern Pacific. To the point that the two
roads were not parallel and that the alleged combination neither eliminated competition in the field of transcontinental transportation at large nor shut the door to
new competition, Day replied that "It is the scope of such combinations and their
power to suppress or stifle competition or create monopoly which determine the applicability of the act."' 24 Nor was the controlling factor "mere bigness." ". . . bigness was legal if it were the result of natural growth. . . . Whether a combination
controlled 95 per cent of the industry, or 50 per cent, or 20 per cent, it was illegal...
if it possessed even the potential power to stifle or suppress competition."25 The
suggestion that a distinction should be made between "good" and "bad" trusts seems
not to have impressed him. Dr. McLean has noted that through all Day's opinions
in this field there runs a deep distrust of concentrated corporate power, and that
there are deep affinities between this distrust and the equally pronounced distrust
of a centralized government with powers concentrated in it at the expense of the reserved power of the states. Day distrusted concentrated power whether economic
or political. Perhaps here we have the key to his judicial philosophy rather than
in some of the suggestions offered by the author. .
17.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 65 (1905)

(Day concurred with the dissent-

ing opinion of Justice Harland).
18. 236 U. S. 1, 27 (1915).
19. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 28 (1915).
20. P. 137.
21. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); Unitcd States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911).
22.

P. 85.

23. P. 99, citing HANDLER, A STnY oFa TuE CONSTnUTION AND ENFORCEixENT OF TUE
FEEAr. AN-TRusr LAws 82 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
24. United States v. Union P. R. R., 226 U. S. 61, 88 (1912).
25. Pp. 99-100.
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Dr. McLean's work also suggests to this reviewer the inutility of attaching the
label "liberaF' or "conservative" to any Supreme Court justice. This practice smacks
too much of Humpty Dumpty's remark to Alice "When I use a word it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." Dr. McLean's statistics20 make
it ridiculous to label Day as a "reactionary," a "laissez-fairist," or a "conservative."
He was not indeed a great "crusader" like Brandeis. The Public did not acclaim him
as a great "liberal" like Holmes. Yet his record on the anti-trust cases, as Dr.
McLean shows, is stronger than that of either Holmes or Brandeis.27 Indeed Holmes
"generally opposed enforcement of the anti-trust laws. . . ."s Apparently, as the
prosperity of a jest lies in the ear of him who hears it, the value of the label "liberal"
or "conservative" lies in the preconceived notions of the one who affixes it.
The reader will find in this study a truly great, if not a glamorous, judge who
did the tasks assigned to him quietly, calmly, modestly. He was indeed, as Justice
Brandeis said of him at his death, "a truly great citizen," and the author's conversations with men now living who knew Day and worked with him makes abundantly
clear the affection and respect with which he was regarded. Justice Day's contribution to Constitutional Law is now a matter of history. That is not to say
that it is a dead thing now of interest only to historians. It forms another link in
the lengthening chain of our constitutional development. We have often been told
that we cannot know what the law is, nor can we plan what it shall one day be,
without knowing what it once was. With us, too, a Constitution "slowly broadens
down from precedent to precedent." Dr. McLean, has in a most scholarly manner,
vividly recalled the work of one who labored well in that unending task.
EDWAiRn F. BAxmn't

GENmERAL PRICIPLES OF CRImINAL LAW. By Jerome Hall. Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1947. Pp. x, 618. $7.00.
Twelve years have elapsed between the publication of Theft, Law and Society,
and the publication of the present book. Professor Hall states in his preface that a
great part of his time in the intervening years has been devoted to a study of the
subject matter of the present book. The breadth of treatment, the historical analysis and skillful exposition, the extensive and scholarly documentation, all disclose a
care, research and study which render quite unnecessary the author's modest introductory statement.
The title to Theft, Law and Society fairly described the subject matter of that
book, which was concerned to a great extent with the impact of social and economic
conditions upon the historical development of those crimes involving property which
are comprehended under the popular word "theft." The title of the present book is
apt to be misleading. The "General Principles of Criminal LaV" might easily be
thought to refer to the more or less superficial treatment of the rules of substantive criminal law which one will find in most of the commonly used texts on crimi26. P. 83 nn. 62, 63.
27. Ibid.
28. P. 83 n. 63.
t Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1.
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nal law, such American classics as Bishop, Wharton and May not being excluded.
This is not said in disparagement of such worthy texts which do not pretend to be
anything more than law books. Professor Hall's recent book is much more than a
law book. The copious references in it to ancient and modem rules of criminal law
are inserted solely to enable the author to attain his principal objective: to probe
for and expound what he believes to be the foundations for penal responsibility. More
accurate and revealing titles for the book might be "Moral and Criminal Law" or
"Ethics and the Criminal Law."
After commenting upon the relative absence in legal literature of any real criminal law theory concerned with the ethical and moral validity of the rules of criminal
law, Professor Hall commences his task with a consideration of the "principle of
legality," nulla poena sine lege. This principle, he points out, has characterized
Anglo-American legal history (with the exception of the period of the Star Chamber);
its absence, implicit in the injunction upon some Continental magistrates to employ
"legal analogy" has been most sharply evidenced under the Nazi regime and in the
Soviet legal system, despite the latter's publicized Bill of Rights. As the author
states, this "first principle" affirms "the ineffable value of the individual human
2
being."
Chapters three and four deal with the complex, perplexing and ever-fascinating
topic of criminal attempts. The discussion from the purely historical side (Chapter
three) is of itself worth-while. However, the analysis of the always present theoretical difficulties required in defining and limiting the crime of attempt, involving
as they do the interplay of theories of punishment and the restricted nature of law
as an instrument dealing wholly with external social harms-evil thoughts and intents
by themselves are not criminal-has a special importance in the structure of what
appears to be the central theme of the book, namely, the fundamental purpose of
punishment, or in other words, the ultimate basis of criminality.
In the next chapter, five, the author really gets into his main theme with a discussion of mens rea and moral culpability and concludes "it is just to punish those
who have intentionally committed moral wrongs, proscribed by law."a Here again
Professor Hall, of course, recognizes that criminal law is a limited instrument, circumscribed by factors of practical administration on the one hand and on the other
by certain constitutional principles embodied in the maxim milla poena sine lege.
But within these limits, he asserts, "our criminal law rests precisely upon the same
foundation as does our traditional ethics: human beings are responsible for their
volitional conduct." '4 Later on the author is forced to admit that some of the doctrines of criminal law are not merely amoral, but are definitely invalid on moral
grounds.
Most of the discussion on mens rea is concerned with the part which motive, as
distinguished from intention, plays in criminal law. The author is of the opinion
that two fundamental fallacies pervade, the extant literature on the subject: (1) referring particularly to Stephen of England and Sayre of this country, the restriction
of moral culpability to, and the identification of mens rea with, motivation; (2) the
complete confusion of motive with intention (Austin's view). Professor Hall seems
to take the position, borne out by the case law, that the only relevance of motive,
from the viewpoint of criminal law, is its bearing on the intention to do the ex2. P. 59.
3. P. 166.
4. Ibid.
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ternal act proscribed by the penal law. Motive, he asserts, refers to the actor,
whereas intention points to the impact of the action on others. It must be conceded
that from the viewpoint of ethics one of the principal determinants of the morality
of an action is the motive of the actor, i.e., the end aimed at by him. Saint Thomas
Aquinas and Aristotle both seemed to think that one who stole money in order to
be able to'commit adultery was more of an adulterer than a thief. And yet the
criminal law, whose specific function is the prevention and punishment of external
harms, would not be interested in the motive if the charge were larceny, except in so
far as it might be evidential of intent, but would simply designate the act as larceny. The prosecutor, of course, would not indict for adultery, unless that crime
were actually committed. This merely confirms the fact that the criminal law does
not attempt to enforce the moral law in its totality. It is heartening, however, to
hear Professor Hall assert as a "tenable assumption" that "the trend has been from
the irrelevance of motive to its recognition as essential to a just administration of
the law." 5
The author's conclusion that modern penal law is founded on moral culpability
conflicts sharply with the theory of objective liability, to which Holmes gave an
added impetus and which, at least until recently, enjoyed quite a vogue. Therefore,
it is not surprising that Professor Hall devotes most of Chapter six to a clear and
incisive analysis and, in this reviewer's opinion, convincing refutation of Holmes'
theory which the author correctly states "was the product of a Utilitarianism which
held expediency not only the sole objective of all law but also an adequate one"03
and which the author apparently ascribes to "the advanced sophistication in the days
' 7
of Holmes' youth.
The discussion in Chapter seven of the interrelation of criminal law and torts stresses
a basic distinction existing between the fundamental principles which should obtain
in the two fields of law-a distinction which Holmes' theory would negate--namely,
that moral culpability is of primary importance in criminal law while it is only of
incidental importance in torts, unmoral conduct being simply one of the ways by
which individuals suffer economic damage.
Perhaps nowhere is this distinction more lost sight of than in the imposition of
penal responsibility for merely negligent (i.e., inadvertent) conduct. This rather frequent lapse in the application of the fundamental principles of criminal law has at
some time troubled most serious students of criminal law, except, naturally, those
who subscribe entirely to the Holmes' school of thought. This phenomenon in the
administration of the law forms the subject of discussion of Chapter eight of Professor Hall's book. His position seems to be morally (and, therefore, legally) sound
and appears to be supported by the more recent and better reasoned judicial decisions. Negligence in the tort sense judged solely by the objective reasonable man
norm has no place in the scheme of criminal responsibility. To find criminal guilt,
as distinct from civil liability for damages, recklessness in the moral sense, (sometimes loosely referred to as "gross negligence"), which involves a state of mind
tantamount to intent, should be present (Holmes to the contrary notwithstanding).
The much abused maxim that a man is presumed to have intended the natural and
probable consequences of his act, while it may be applicable substantively in the

5. P. 149.
6. P. 181. See Ford, The Fundanentals of Holnes' Juristic Philosophy, 11 FoPD. L.
Rav. 255 (1942).

7. P. 187.
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case of certain torts, should in criminal law constitute at most the basis for a permi~sible (i.e., logical) inference of what is the really significant fact, namely, the
mens rea. The payment of damages by the negligent tortfeasor is, as Professor
Hall so aptly states, "hardly more than a tax on incompetence," 8 but it is inconsistent with fundamental moral principles to hold criminally responsible for certain
consequences a person unless he consciously adverts in some degree to the possibility
of those consequences occurring.9
In Chapter nine Professor Hall understandably experiences difficulty in reconciling the prevalent attitude of the case law with his thesis that it is just to punish
those who have intentionally committed a moral wrong. The chapter deals with
criminal omissions and treats such cases as the expert swimmer refusing to save a
drowning child. Professor Hall's explanation of the apparent lack of conformity
between what is generally held to be the moral duty and the legal duty is that to
involve criminality there must exist a moral obligation resting especially upon the
person involved (in the example, the swimmer). The mores of the community,
the author admits, have not developed to the point where the public considers everyone obliged to be his neighbor's keeper. Even assuming that the author is correct
in his appraisal of the public attitude on such an ethical problem, it does not follow
that such a public attitude is a moral one in any real sense of the word. The author
suggests that this apparent discrepancy between morals and law may be obviated
by legislation imposing less severe penalties upon strangers than upon those who,
because of a special relationship, owe a clear duty to protect another, thus it would
seem allowing that the mores of the times may not be entirely moral.
To be logically consistent with his main thesis Professor Hall must, as he does,
take the position that strict liability cannot be brought within the scope of penal
law; that whatever kind of liability it may be, it is not criminal liability. The discussion in Chapter ten relates principally to the so-called public welfare offenses,
for the conviction of which the traditional view is that proof of mens rea is not
required. Professor Hall does not believe that the time honored distinction between
vala in se and mala prohibita furnishes any logical support for the inclusion of
the doctrine of strict liability in criminal law; for he avers that it is impossible to
determine that behavior is immoral entirely apart from and irrespective of its prohibition in positive law and that such suggested separation of positivo law and moral
principles ignores the fact that our ethical principles are in a great measure the
product of positive law. This certainly smacks of the positivism which Professor
Hall on the whole so roundly condemns. In fact .there appears to be a noteworthy
defect and omission in Professor Hall's presentation. His central theme is that the
criminal law should be rooted in morality. However, no real effort is made by him
to define morality or its norm; here and there Professor Hall appears to identify
the moral law with the temporary mores of the community. No important reference is made to the natural law, which alone gives to positive law the basis of whatever
moral obligation positive law imposes. The author, it is true, speaks of an objective
morality, but certainly not in the sense of an imperative norm having an objective
and absolute validity, an unchanging law of nature and reason. He is of the opinion
8. P. 241.
9. The failure to recognize some degree of mens rea as a necessary element of culpable
negligence accounts for much of the difficulty in attempting to frame a satisfactory
definition of such conduct. This is the principal defect in a recent study of the subject.
MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIBEINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944).
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that judgments implying the immorality of well-motivated actions "rest on the
premise that morality is objective and may be validly opposed to individual
opinion,"' 0 because the criminal law represents an objective ethics (the ethical judgments of the community) which is sometimes opposed to individual convictions of
what is right." For example, he states that the intentional or reckless failure to
remove garbage or to sweep sidewalks is to some degree morally wrong, and yet he
seems to admit the "debatableness" of the morality of the "euthanasia movement
in respected medical circles."'-' To Professor Hall the weakness in the malum in se
-inalutm prohibitum distinction is the fact that acts which are now mala in se were
not always mald in se and vice versa. Relativists and positivists, of course, would
agree with such a statement.' 3
To fit the public welfare offenses into his concept of the proper subject matter
of criminal law, Professor Hall disregards the usual argument in favor of inclusion
based on administrative inconvenience and difficulty of proof of melts rca and proposes as a substitute for strict liability a "differential treatment" for public welfare
offenders, namely, the imposition of "sanctions" varying gradually downward from
the punitive, to the corrective, protective and compensatory "each corresponding
generally to salient differentiae in certain types of harms,"' 4 with the punitive sanctions reserved for harms involving moral culpability. Thus there would be preserved,
possibly through the expedient of transferring jurisdiction over offenses having nonpunitive sanctions to certain administrative agencies, the consistency which the
author thinks should obtain between fundamental criminal theory and punishment.
Ignorance and mistake constitute the subject matter of Chapter eleven. As to
those instances where the criminal law disregards actual ignorance of fact as a defense on the ground that such ignorance was unreasonable, the author is categorical:
"This branch of our law is so thoroughly disorganized, rests so largely on conjecture
and unsound psychology and effects such gross injustice as to require major reform." 1 5
In dealing with the maxim ignorantia legis eminem excusat and attempting to reconcile it with mens rea, Professor Hall is constrained to concede the necessary paramountcy of the objectivity of law over' the subjectivity of private 9pinion and
belief and to state that "the rules of criminal law include and reflect certain basic
10. P. 159.

11. P. 355.
12.

P. 295.

13. One hesitates to consider what our future law and "morality" will be, when we
find a federal court recently stating that the decisions of the courts should follow the
mores of the times and holding that the present sentiment of the community does not
view as morally reprehensible what amounts to chronic adultery, a relationship which
the court characterized as a "faithful and long continued" one. Petitions of Rudder,
159 F. 2d 695, 698 (C. C. A. 2d 1947). Positive law condemns adultery as a crime, and
apparently the same court interprets the public attitude as still viewing an isolated act
of adultery "prompted by lust" as immoral. Petitions of Rudder, supra, citing Estrin v.
United States, 80 F. 2d 105 (C. C. A. 2d 1935). Cf. Repouile v. United States, 165 F. 2d
152 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), in which in an interesting opinion the majority of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, writing through judge Learned Hand, held with some hesitation
that the majority of the community still condemns euthanasia as an immoral act. judge
Frank dissented.
14.

Pp. 319-20.

15. P. 343.
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moral principles; to recognize ignorance of the law as a defense would contradict
those values."' 6 However, on the troublesome bigamy cases the author is of the
opinion that "the continued imposition of strict liability in charges of bigamy, on
the rationalization that this is required by ignorantia legis neminem excusat, can only be
17
characterized as both cruel and unenlightened."' Consistently with the view expressed in an earlier chapter, ten, Professor Hall asserts that as to the petty infractions of the law, criminality should presuppose knowledge that the act is legally
forbidden.
United States v. Holmes,'8 because of its drama, and Regina v. Dudley &
Stephens,19 because of its stark reality, surely remain imbedded in the minds of
most law students. A good part of Chapter twelve is devoted to the contrasting ,
views of the American and English courts on the defense of necessity set up in these
two cases. Both cases involved the deliberate killing of a person to save the lives of
other persons. The American decision appeared to sanction the defense of necessity
but insisted upon a method of selection by casting lots to determine the person
whose life was to be sacrificed. The English decision in effect repudiated the defense. Apparently favoring the American view Professor Hall repudiates what he
terms the "dogmas concerning self-preservation and consequent indiscriminate exculpation," 20 and suggests the standard of just punishment with its corollary that
where one of two harms is unavoidable, it is right to choose the lesser one. In
applying this standard to the classical illustration of two men struggling in mid-ocean
for a plank that can support only one of them, Professor Hall concludes that it is
better that one live than that both die but that "fair methods" must be used to
determine which one is to be sacrificed, following the suggestion of the court in
United States v. Holmes. Professor Hall distinguishes necessity from coercion by
stating that in the former case man bows to the inevitable; that in the latter case
there is no such inevitability and, therefore, there should be no submission to the
evil-doer exercising the coercion. Hence, even where coercion takes the form of
a threat of death, the author concludes that all very serious crimes should be placed
beyond the privilege of harm-doing under coercion.
This reviewer is inclined to agree with Professor Hall in his criticism (Chapter
thirteen) of the treatment of intoxication in the prosecution of crimes. Even the
present view that "voluntary" intoxication is never, as such, a defense, but may
be considered by the jury in determining the existence of the particular state of
mind required by the definition of the crime, does not appear to be sufficiently
enlightened in view of the recent medical approach to the problem of alcoholism.
The author is correct in stating that "involuntary" intoxication is simply and completely non-existent, since it consists in the actual, physical and overt forcing of
alcohol into a person. The young man who drinks for the first time and the dipsomaniac are, in the eyes of the law, cases of "voluntary" intoxication. The present law represents a crude compromise between a realization on the one hand that
the moral culpability of a drunken killer should be distinguished from that of the
sober killer, and on the other hand that a person who voluntarily indulges in alcohol
should not escape the consequences. To hold that an individual who drinks intoxi16.
17.
18.
19.

P.353.
P. 372.
26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15,383 (E. D. Pa. 1842).
14 Q. B. D. 273 (1884).

20. P. 425.
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cating liquor should be responsible for whatever harm he subsequently does while
grossly intoxicated can be justified only if his drinking usually leads to intoxication and the latter in turn to commission of serious harms and that he knows this
usually is the result. One of the conclusions reached by Professor Hall is "that
normal persons, who commit harms while grossly intoxicated, should not be punished
unless, at the time of sobriety and the voluntary drinking, they had such prior
experience as to anticipate their intoxication and that they would become dangerous
in that condition."'- This conclusion seems sound.
Chapter fourteen on mental disease consists in part of a counter-attack on those
American psychologists, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who have attacked the
rules announced in the famous M'Naghten case, 22 especially the so-called "right and
wrong" test of insanity. Professor Hall's defense of the rules appears to be effective, especially in its rejection of the Freudian disparagement and neglect of the
moral judgment and the ability to discriminate between good and evil. The chapter
is particularly interesting in its discussion of "irresistible impulse" and "moral
insanity," so-called diseases of the will, which most jurisdictions refuse to accept
in exculpation of what would be otherwise criminal acts. Professor Hall defends the
essential soundness of the M'Naghten rules as principles of penal responsibility but
favors the theory of the "integration of the self"2 and suggests an amendment of
the M'Naglten rules to overcome any defect in their failure to take into account
the emotional and volitional aspects of conduct, as by permitting "irresistible impulse" to be considered when it is accompanied by mental disease. The author
properly rejects irresistible impulse as a separate ground for exculpation.
Much of the final chapter of the book is confined to adverse criticism of the positivistic school of criminology founded by Lombroso, who, although he professed not
to be interested in any precise interpretation of crime, was certain that he knew a
"criminal" when he saw one. The first theorist of this school, Garofalo, considered
any legal notion of crime valueless for purposes of criminology. Ferri, the school's
orator-he eventually became an ardent follower of Fascism and of Mussolinihad a tremendous influence on American criminology. He defined punishable acts
24
as "those which shock the average morality of a given people at a given moment.
Professor Hall takes the position that criminology is validated as a distinctive
discipline by its ultimate reference to actual penal law and all relevant social
phenomena. Any study of the "etiology" of crime cannot discount freedom of
the will, the author asserts. The hypotheses that the human being is rational and that
his conduct embodies degrees of autonomy and self-control, if accepted, promise
greater actual accomplishment in the understanding of criminal behavior and in the reform of criminal law than positivism and determinism. It is just as fallacious
to confuse punishment with cruelty as it is to identify retribution or reparation with
revenge. The author concludes his book by conceding that criminologists have made
scholarly contributions to our understanding of criminal behavior. Yet he ends on
a correct note which is the same one which pervades the entire book and which is
consistent with the author's recognition that our criminal law imposes an obligation on man, a rational animal, created by God to his own image and likeness, who
possesses a free will.
21.

P. 475.

22.
23.

10 C1. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
P. 493.

24. P. 549.
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The law student or lawyer who is merely satisfied with a knowledge of the positive rules of law will not find Professor Hall's book as interesting and provocative
as the legal scholar, especially the teacher of criminal law who will read and reread
the book, not only for its textual content, but because of the exhaustive and
eclectic footnote references. In fact if the book served no other purpose, it would
be most useful for the historical data it sets forth. In this respect, as in The/t,
Law and Society, Professor Hall has shown himself to be a master.
What has been written in this review must not be taken as an epitome of Professor Hall's book. It is impossible in such a short space to touch on all the
problems discussed or even to indicate the serious scholarship it discloses. Undoubtedly there will be some-one hopes they will not be in the majority-who will
disagree with Professor Hall's central theme. Many ethicians will most certainly
question some of the postulates of the author, especially his assumption that the
mores of the community is the basis of moral law. However, on the whole, it
appears that Professor Hall's scholarship has been productive of a stimulating and
significant contribution to current ethico-legal literature.
FRANCIS

NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

X.

CONWAYf

By Milton Lewis Grossman.

Buffalo:

Dennis & Company, Inc., 1947. Pp. lv, 1180. $15.00.
Professor Kane introduced his casebook with this comment: "After many years
experience in the teaching of Domestic Relations, I find that it has become increasingly difficult to present the subject properly unless it be confined to one state, or
at least to a group of states. Family law is now so regulated by statute that it
can no longer be classed as a 'common law' subject with Contracts and Torts, but
is as much a 'statutory' subject as Sales, or Bills and Notes, with the unfortunate
difference that there is no uniformity in the statutes." 1 If the teacher of the law
finds it necessary to key his approach to the decisions of one, or at most two or
three jurisdictions, we can appreciate the problem of the practising lawyer preparing
for litigation in the state courts. Mr. Grossman's book should receive an enthusiastic welcome by the New York Bar.
The last few years have been marked by such radical change of statutory provision and such extensive development of case law as almost to require a complete
review of this subject. Mr. Grossman has given us an up to date compendium of
ruling case and statute law in New York. The book contains the citation of thousands of cases and of the important statutes each with a short statement of the
rule. Any law book is only as good as its index and here the author is particularly
to be commended. One hundred and forty-three pages are devoted to the descriptive word index alone with a separate index to cases and statutes. What is in the
book can be readily found and the lawyer Will find it a prolific source of case law.
This work does not purport to be a thorough text discussion. We have rather
an outline treatment with a rule for every case and a case for every rule. Such a
treatment will suffice for the busy lawyer who is looking for the case and uses
the book as a means to that end. The same treatment is completely unequal to a
mature discussion of the fundamental principles underlying the jurisdictional questions in foreign divorces.
f Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
I.. KANtE, CASES ON DomESTc RELATIONS III (1936).
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The attempted 'reduction of groups of cases to a one or two-sentence rule will
invariably result in the production of some half-truths. For example Section 91
sets forth the following statement supported by six citations: "The factors of consent, ability, present promise and cohabitation or mutual and open assumption of
marital duties and obligations, are all necessary elements of a common law marriage, and the absence of any one is fatal." At least one of the cases here cited
points out that cohabitation is not required in all cases to render the marriage valid
where a specific agreement is otherwise established. 2 Such general statements as the
quoted principle are admittedly to be found in opinions but they are subject to the
criticism that they do not accurately discriminate between the fact of marriage and
the proof of it, a distinction probably unnecessary in the particular case.
Judge Dye in his introduction to Mr. Grossman's book points out that the
author does not attempt a philosophical discussion of the broad general subject.a
This must be borne in mind in any appraisal of this work. Many of the citations
are of the lower courts. The holding of the case is tersely stated and as accurately
as possible in view of the brevity. No attempt is made to evaluate the soundness
of the court's position. Sections 962 and 963 set forth what is stated to be respectively the former rule and the present rule with regard to injunctions to restrain action without the state. The so-called former rule is that set forth by
the Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. Goldsteit.4 As indicated in this text a number
of New York Supreme Court decisions have held that this rule is no longer law in
view of Williams v. North Carolio 5 and its express overruling of Haddock v.
Haddock.6 Whether this conclusion is logical has been the subject at least of sharp
difference of opinion in the Appellate Division, First Department, in Pereira v.
Pereira7 and the Court of Appeals Ims not yet had occasion to epress its opinion.
The volume contains a chapter devoted to forms, being chiefly composed of forms
of separation agreement, ante-nuptial agreement and complaints in the different types
of matrimonial action. Unlike the other portions of the book the forms are not supported by the citation of any decided cases. In the use of any form without further
research the practitioner is therefore relying solely upon the authority of the author
and his own judgmenL
The busy practitioner whose eyes are wearied by the small unbroken type of the
law journal will find the large type and the absence of footnotes a restful change.
By the same token an adherence to the format of the standard text would have produced a volume less than half as bulky.
For the lawyer schooled in the principles underlying the Law of Domestic Relations there has been a need for a ready reference to the recent and ruling case law
in New York. Grossman's "New York Law of Domestic Relations" will fill this need.
It is not, nor is it obviously intended to be, a short cut to fundamental principles.
Within the limits of its purpose it is a real contribution to the lawyers' library.
BERNAn J. O'CoNELmt
2. Karameros v. Luther, 166 Misc. 376, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1938), af'd, 254
App. Div. 845, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 319 (1st Dep't 1938), reversed, 279 N. Y. 87, 17 N. E. 2d
779 (1938).
3. P.ix.
4. 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940).
5. 317 U. S.287 (1942).
6. 201 U. S.562 (1906).
7. 272 App. Div. 281, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (1st Dep't 1947), 16 FoRD. L. Rv. 288.
t Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.

